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URING THE CIVIL WAR in Liberia, rebels from the
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
(LURD) came to “Mrs. J’s” home, shot and killed her
father, gang-raped her, abducted her, and held her
against her will. While held hostage she was forced to perform a
variety of household tasks for the LURD rebels, including cooking
and doing laundry. After several weeks in captivity, Mrs. J escaped
and made her way to a refugee camp where she now awaits reset-
tlement to another country. In 1992 Sierra Leonean rebels attacked
“Mrs. D’s” family. The rebels brutally killed one family member
with machetes, severely burned another, and raped Mrs. D and her
daughter. The rebels held the family captive for four days in their
own home. Like Mrs. J, Mrs. D is awaiting refugee resettlement.
Both women were designated “refugees” by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and, until
recently, would be eligible for resettlement in the United States.
Today, however, they are not. Although the United States
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initially agreed with
UNHCR’s determination that both women were eligible for reset-
tlement in the United States, DHS recently put both cases on
indefinite hold, alleging that these women provided “material sup-
port” to terrorists.1 According to DHS the cooking and laundry
services that the LURD forced Mrs. J to provide while holding her
hostage and the shelter that rebels obtained by force from Mrs. D
constitute “material support” to a terrorist group.2
Antiterrorism legislation adopted under the USA PATRIOT
Act of 20013 and the REAL ID Act of 20054 amended section 212
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to widely expand
the class of individuals considered inadmissible to the U.S. for hav-
ing “engaged in terrorist activity,” including providing “material
support” to “terrorists” or “terrorist organizations.”5 The collection
of amended terrorism provisions in the INA creates the grounds
for inadmissibility that this article refers to as the “material support
bar.” As a result of its overbroad language and lack of a defense of
duress, the “material support bar” has already prevented thousands
of refugees from obtaining asylum relief or resettlement in the
United States. Although this legislation may have imposed a for-
midable barrier on the ability of terrorists to pose as refugees, it has
also had the perverse effect of shutting the gate on thousands of
meritorious refuges who are the victims of terrorism. In effect, the
U.S. has foreclosed entry for those individuals who have suffered
at the very hands of the terrorist groups it seeks to target.
HARMING VICTIMS WHILE HELPING TERRORISTS?
The material support bar is written and applied as a catchall.
It effectively excludes any individual who ever provided goods,
services, or funds to an armed group from U.S. refugee protection,
even if, like Mrs. J and Mrs. D, they are victims of the groups they
supposedly “support.” The principal problems with the material
support bar are threefold. First, it adopts an overly expansive defi-
nition of “terrorism,” “terrorist organization,” and “terrorist activ-
ity.” Second, “support” is broadly defined with no exception for
minimal levels of support. As a result, DHS interprets “material”
support to include even insignificant amounts of support. Third,
as in the cases of Mrs. J and Mrs. D, there is no explicit duress
defense available to situations where “material support” was pro-
vided under the threat of harm. In spite of these problems, adjudi-
cators of resettlement and asylum claims are applying the bar
strictly and broadly, “catching” an assortment of refugee popula-
tion in its net.
The law makes inadmissible any alien who is a member of a
“terrorist organization” or who “has engaged in terrorist activity.”6
“Terrorist organizations” are defined as either (1) those designated
by name as foreign terrorist organizations under Title 8, U.S.
Code, 1189 (known as Tier I organizations) or “otherwise desig-
nated” as such by the Secretary of State (known as Tier II organi-
zations)7 or (2) any “group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which
engages in” certain enumerated terrorist activities (known as Tier
III, non-designated organizations).8 The definition of “terrorist
activities” includes “a threat, attempt, or conspiracy” to use “any …
explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other
than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger,
directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to
cause substantial damage to property.”9 Activity that meets this
definition is considered “terrorist” if the activity is “unlawful under
the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if it had been
committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws
of the United States or any State).”10 
The statute provides that an individual has “engage(d) in terror-
ist activity” if he or she committed “an act that the actor knows, or
reasonably should know, affords material support … for the commis-
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sion of a terrorist activity” or to “a terrorist organization.”11 “Material
support” includes, but is not limited to, “a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial
benefit, false documentation or identification, [and] weapons.”12
An individual found under the law to have “engage(d) in ter-
rorist activities” by providing material support to a “terrorist” or to
a non-designated, Tier III “terrorist organization,”13 is entitled only
to a “lack of knowledge” defense.14 An individual must prove that
she “did not know and should not reasonably have known” that
she was providing “material support,” or that the recipient planned
to commit a terrorist activity or was a non-designated Tier III ter-
rorist organization.15 Only if the individual shows this lack of
knowledge will the admissibility bar be inapplicable. The law
includes no other common defenses to culpability, such as the
defenses of duress and self-defense, nor an exception for minimal
or insignificant support.16 
The USA Patriot Act and the REAL ID Act have provided the
executive branch some discretion in applying the material support
bar by adopting a waiver provision. Under the law, on a case-by-case
basis, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
after consultation with each other and the Attorney General, can
decide not to apply the material support bar to a particular individ-
ual or group who supported an organization or individual engaged
in terrorist activities.17 Although the authority for the discretionary
waiver exists, it only recently was exercised for the first time.18 
PROBLEM 1: TERRORISM DEFINITONS COMMINGLE
REFUGEES WITH TERRORISTS
Under the definition of “terrorist organization,” an individual
who gave support to virtually any armed group can be excluded
from entry to the United States, whether or not the group was pre-
viously designated a terrorist organization. If an organization is not
already designated as a terrorist organization, the material support
bar allows DHS adjudicators and immigration judges to evaluate
whether an organization qualifies as a non-designated Tier III ter-
rorist organization. DHS asserts that Congress intended the mate-
rial support inadmissibility ground “to be able to capture all poten-
tial forms [of ] terrorist activity and material support to terrorist
activity.”19 But the law makes no substantive distinction between
actual “terrorist organizations,” such as Al-Qaeda, and organiza-
tions struggling against repressive regimes for democracy or libera-
tion, such as the Burmese Chin National Front.20 
The definition of “terrorist organization” is based on whether
illegal violence was used, not on the character of the organization,
the nature of the conflict, or the type of government in question.21
Therefore, it can apply equally to organizations that the U.S. gov-
ernment opposes or supports. For example, according to DHS a
refugee who provided support to Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance
in the 1990s would be barred from entry even though the
Northern Alliance was fighting the Taliban government, a regime
the U.S. government considered illegitimate.22 DHS has also
recently put on hold the resettlement cases of 147 Cubans who
provided support to the “Alzados,” an armed group that fought
against Fidel Castro in the 1960s.23 Although their “Alzado” fami-
ly members were resettled in the United States years ago, these
individuals are now barred from joining them.
Similarly, it applies to nationals of Burma (Myanmar) who
work with pro-democracy organizations that the United States sup-
ports. DHS applied the material support bar to some 9,300
Burmese refugees awaiting resettlement from the Tham Hin refugee
camp in Thailand.24 These refugees are predominately from the
Karen ethnic minority who provided indirect support to the Karen
National Union (KNU), a political and armed group resisting
Myanmar’s repressive military regime.25 DHS put their cases on
indefinite hold until May 2006 when Secretary of State Condeleeza
Rice and Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff agreed
to use their discretionary authority to waive the application of the
bar to those refugees who provided material support to the KNU.26 
The absurd results of such an expansive definition of a “terror-
ist organization” do not end there. The definition of terrorist organ-
ization is so broad that it would even apply to U.S. military activity
abroad. DHS recently admitted in oral argument before the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that the Iraqi national who provided
information to the U.S. Marines who rescued American soldier
Jessica Lynch would be barred from entry under this law.27 Under
the current definition of “terrorist organization,” the U.S. Marines
would qualify as a Tier III terrorist organization because their activ-
ity was unlawful during the U.S. occupation of Iraq under Iraqi law
and they were fighting against an established government.28
Similarly, in accordance with DHS’s literal application of the
law, U.S. troops in Vietnam during the Vietnam War would have
qualified as a Tier III terrorist organization. The Hmong people of
Laos, many of whom were recruited by the Central Intelligence
Agency to fight alongside U.S. troops in Vietnam, could be ineli-
gible for resettlement for providing “material support” to “terror-
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“By not applying a de minimis exception, DHS and U.S. courts
are failing to limit the material support bar to actual terrorists and
their supporters. Instead, they extend the material support bar to
innocent civilians in war-torn regions throughout the world who
are often forced to pay negligible ‘war taxes’ in currency or goods
to rebel or terrorist groups.”
ists,” i.e., the U.S. government. Over 100,000 Hmong refugees are
resettled in the United States,29 but DHS recently put the resettle-
ment cases of as least 30 Hmong refugees in Thailand on indefi-
nite hold on material support grounds, presumably for their sup-
port to U.S.-backed Hmong armed resistance against the govern-
ment of Laos.30 The resulting denial of admission to myriad
refugee population was clearly not within the scope of Congress’
intent when the material bar was drafted.
PROBLEM 2: “MATERIAL SUPPORT” INCLUDES IMMATERIAL
SUPPORT
The current law does not explicitly account for the amount and
nature of the support given when determining whether an individ-
ual provided “material support” or include an explicit exception for
de minimis support. The Department of Justice has argued that it
was “Congress’s intent that the material support provision be broad-
ly construed and strictly applied.”31 Further, DHS construes “mate-
rial support” as though all support, no matter now nominal, is per se
“material.” DHS counsel argued before the BIA and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit that Congress intended “material
support” as a legal term of art that means any support, no matter
how insignificant.32 As such, the DHS interpretation effectively
reads the word “material” out of the provision and concludes that
even a contribution of five dollars is “material support.”33
In Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit agreed with DHS
and adopted a broad definition of “support.”34 The court found
that providing food and setting up tents for a religious congrega-
tion, which may have included members of the religion’s militant
sect, constituted material support.35 An interpretation of the mate-
rial support bar that does not imply a de minimis exception plainly
violates international law and U.S. obligations under the 1951
Refugee Convention as incorporated under the 1967 Protocal.36
Even though providing funds to a “terrorist group” is a criminal
offense under international law,37 according to UNHCR an indi-
vidual should not be found guilty of engaging in terrorist activity or
a “serious non-political crime” — a bar to refugee protection under
the 1951 Convention — “if the amounts concerned are small and
given on a sporadic basis.”38 By not applying a de minimis excep-
tion, DHS and U.S. courts are failing to limit the material support
bar to actual terrorists and their supporters. Instead, they extend the
material support bar to innocent civilians in war-torn regions
throughout the world who are often forced to pay negligible “war
taxes” in currency or goods to rebel or terrorist groups.
In Colombia, for example, where the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army
(ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
control or contest 75 percent of Colombian territory,39 de minimis
support to these groups is routine. In many rural Colombian con-
texts, support in the form of “war taxes”40 or the provision of food
or shelter is necessary for survival. Irregular armed groups routine-
ly kill civilians who refuse to comply with their material
demands.41 UNHCR estimates that between 70-80 percent of
Colombian refugees seeking asylum in Ecuador are ineligible for
resettlement in the United States because they have provided some
form of material support to these groups.42
In March 2006 law students from Georgetown University
Law Center undertook a fact-finding investigation in Ecuador to
interview Colombian refugees who are ineligible for resettlement
in the United States on material support grounds and review their
cases. The team found that 45 of 63 interviewees (71 percent) had
provided some form of “material support” as currently defined to
a guerilla, paramilitary, or other armed group, and most had pro-
vided only de minimis support.43
In most cases the support given was an unavoidable part of
daily life in areas where the armed groups were present. “Ana,” for
instance, merely provided a glass of water to an armed guerilla from
the FARC who requested one when he came to her home.44
“Mario” occasionally sold basic goods to members of the FARC, the
ELN, and the AUC from his family’s small bodega in the center of
town.45 “Guillermo” sold bread from his bakery to guerillas dis-
guised in civilian clothes,46 while “Juan,” a refrigerator repairman,
was taken to a FARC encampment and forced to repair their refrig-
erators.47 All of these refugees are ineligible for resettlement in the
United States because of the insignificant support they provided. 
In some cases these refugees actively fought against an armed
groups’ terrorist control but were nevertheless forced to provide
some minimal support. For example, “Jorge” was a security guard
who was hired to protect his neighborhood from the sicarios, a
gang of professional assassins that charged residents a “war tax.”
Every week armed men would extort “taxes” from residents.
“Elena,” Jorge’s sister, had to pay 2,000 pesos (the equivalent of 85
cents) to the gang every week. Jorge actively opposed the collection
of the “tax” and the gang’s activities. In retaliation the gang beat
him and shot him five times.48 Despite Jorge’s active opposition of
the sicarios, the family is nevertheless barred from resettlement in
the United States for having made the weekly payments.
PROBLEM 3: REFUGEES VICTIMIZED BY TERRORISTS HAVE
NO DURESS DEFENSE
The material support bar provides no explicit defense for
duress. In the resettlement context, DHS does not imply a duress
defense. In the asylum context, DHS argues and some courts agree
that such a defense should not be read into the statute.
Consequently, the bar applies equally to terrorists and victims of
terrorism. In effect, the bar requires the United States to refuse to
protect an individual who provided “support” to terrorists involun-
tarily or under the threat of death from further terrorist abuse. As
a result, the bar threatens to deny refugee protection to a signifi-
cant number of refugees worldwide fleeing conflicts perpetrated by
“terrorists” or characterized by terrorist violence. 
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The lack of an explicit duress defense and DHS’s refusal to
read one into the material support bar is inconsistent with U.S. and
international law. The principle of “duress” is well recognized in
U.S. criminal law49 and may be implied as a common law defense
even when certain conduct violates criminal statutes.50 In the
absence of an explicit duress defense, the material support bar
should be construed in light of common law and criminal law prin-
ciples of duress. The canons of statutory construction require that
laws be read to “avoid absurd results.”51 It is both an “absurd result”
and incongruent with congressional intent for DHS and the immi-
gration courts to apply the material support bar to victims of terror-
ism when its application should be limited to terrorists themselves
or those who intentionally and voluntarily support terrorism.
In addition, international law is part of U.S. law.52 Treaties
signed and ratified by the United States are the “supreme law of the
land.”53 Under the Charming Betsy doctrine, U.S. courts have an
obligation to interpret the material support bar in a manner con-
sistent with international law, including the 1951 refugee
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, where “fairly possible.”54
Interpreting the material support bar to imply a defense of duress
is a “possible construction” that would not violate international
law.55 Without a duress defense, application of the bar to an indi-
vidual who provided support involuntarily may be inconsistent
with Article 1(F) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967
Protocol, which enumerates the grounds for exclusion from pro-
tection of any individual who has committed serious international
crimes or serious non-political crimes.56 Allegations of terrorist
activity are generally categorized as “serious non-political crimes”
under Article 1(F)(b). The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status suggests, however,
that Article 1(F)(b) must be interpreted restrictively and limited to
“offenses of a serious character” that must constitute “a capital
crime or a very grave punishable act.”57 UNHCR explains that
Article 1(F)(b) is inapplicable “if the circumstances give rise to a
defense, such as coercion or self-defense.”58
Some immigration judges, however, have refused to recog-
nize any duress defense to the material support bar, even in the
most extreme cases of threats of imminent bodily harm. In the
Matter of R.K., for example, an immigration judge declined to
recognize a defense of involuntariness when a Sri Lankan refugee
was kidnapped by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and
forced to pay 50,000 rupees for his release.59 In the overseas
refugee resettlement context, DHS does not apply an exception
for duress, which causes an outright bar to resettlement for
thousands of victims of terrorism.
In the asylum context, interpretations of the material support
bar that do not apply a duress defense violate the principle of cus-
tomary international law and the U.S. treaty obligation of non-
refoulement of refugees who have entered the United States under
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. Under Article 33 the United
States cannot expel or return a refugee to face persecution unless
there are “reasonable grounds for regarding [the refugee] as a dan-
ger to the security of the [United States]” and the refugee “consti-
tutes a danger to the community of [the United States].”60
Applying the material support bar to refugees who provided sup-
port to terrorists under duress is inconsistent with the United
States’ binding obligations under Article 33. Providing “material
support” at gunpoint or under the threat of death does not make
a refugee a danger to the security of the United States.61
The implication of DHS’s application of the material support
bar without a defense of duress is that civilians should allow them-
selves to be killed or jeopardize the lives of their family members
rather than comply with the demands of a controlling terrorist
organization. This is a particularly shocking proposition in the
Colombian context. More often than not, according to the
Georgetown group’s findings, Colombian refugees gave material
support under duress that was part and parcel of their persecution
by terrorist groups. Of the 45 refugees the group interviewed that
gave some form of material support, 73 percent did so under
duress, 24 percent inadvertently, and 3 percent voluntarily.62 For
example, in October 2005 members of the FARC came to
“Louisa’s” house, kidnapped her husband to forcibly conscript him
into their army, and imprisoned her and her two children in their
house for three days.63 DHS’s reasoning would imply that Louisa
should have fought back against the FARC guerillas that impris-
oned her because their literal application of the material support bar
would deem her to have provided shelter to terrorists. “Miguel,” as
a teenager, was kidnapped by marauding AUC paramilitaries on a
killing spree and forced to dig graves as their slaughter ensued.
Other gravediggers were sometimes shot by the paramilitaries and
buried in the graves they had dug. Miguel never knew whether the
grave he was digging would become his own.64 DHS’s reasoning
would imply that Miguel should have refused to dig graves and
stood before the firing squad. In 2003 “Jorge’s” motorcycle and
food were stolen by a group of armed men that ambushed him on
a mountain road. They held him prisoner in a remote mountain
location, where he was chained at the feet during the day and tied
up by his hands at night with a leash around his neck. After 45 days
a guard in the camp helped Jorge escape before all the other prison-
ers in the camp were murdered.65 DHS’s reasoning would imply
that Jorge should have repossessed his motorcycle and food before
fleeing the slaughter that ensued at the prisoner camp. Today,
Louisa, Miguel, and Jorge are all barred from resettlement for pro-
viding goods and services to terrorist organizations.
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“The implication of DHS’s
application of the material
support bar without a defense
of duress is that civilians
should allow themselves to be
killed or jeopardize the lives of
their family members rather
than comply with the
demands of a controlling
terrorist organization.”
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
THE MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR
DHS’S OVERLY LITERAL INTERPRETATION of the poorly drafted
material support bar has already prevented thousands of bona fide
refugees and asylum seekers fleeing the persecution of terrorist
groups from receiving U.S. protection. There are currently 512
asylum cases on indefinite hold at the Asylum Office because of
material support concerns; in many of these cases, asylum seekers
have been held in limbo for years, unable to present their cases to
an immigration judge.66 In 2004 the material support bar effec-
tively shut down the U.S. resettlement program for Colombian
refugees just one year after it was launched, which will have serious
repercussions for the thousands of refugees whom the United
States had originally anticipated resettling. Many of these
Colombian refugees continue to be persecuted by armed groups
operating in their countries of first asylum (like Ecuador) and still
require immediate resettlement to a third country.67 In addition,
thousands of Burmese refugees in Thailand are without protection
because of the material support bar. Liberian, Somali, Laotian
Hmong, Vietnamese Montagnard, and Cuban refugees, among
others, have also had their resettlement cases indefinitely delayed
for material support concerns.68
Congress must urgently amend the material support bar, and
the executive branch must interpret the material support bar in con-
cert with U.S. obligations under international law. Without legisla-
tive change, the material support bar will continue to have profound-
ly harmful consequences on refugees fleeing war-torn regions around
the world. The material support bar currently stands to vindicate the
very terrorists the United States opposes while abandoning the vic-
tims of terror the United States has long sought to protect. HRB
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